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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OP UTAH

PIONEER STATE BANK,
a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
Case No. 20346

vs.
DENNIS G. CHURCH, JAY E. LEWIS,
RAY M. MAAG, ROCKY MOUNTAIN
TITLE & ABSTRACT COMPANY, a
Utah corporation, THE TITLE
GUARANTEE COMPANY, a
corporation,
Defendants-Respondents

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT TITLE GUARANTEE
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Did payment by the insurer (Title Guarantee)

to the insured (Pioneer), pursuant to Pioneerrs threat to
sell the remaining collateral consisting of two condominiums,
of the entire amount of principal indebtedness, interest
and fees, which amount was in excess of the face amount of
insurance under a lender's title insurance policy, discharge
Title Guaranteed responsibility to Pioneer under the policy?
2-

Was Pioneer, who had previously purchased Lake

Meadows, the other parcel of the insured collateral in fee

-2as an investment at a foreclosure sale by a prior lender>
entitled to require Title Guarantee to pay Pioneer
additional amounts under the policy for Pioneer's alleged
losses on that investment because of lack of an access to
Lake Meadows which access had been a part of the collateral
but had been earlier released by Pioneer?
3.

Did the lower court correctly determine that

Pioneer failed to prove fraud and bad faith, and had not
mitigated its alleged damages?
PREFATORY STATEMENT OF THE CASE
AND THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW
This case involves a situation in which Pioneer Bank
in October3 1979 loaned $703000 secured by two condominiums
and the Lake Meadows platted subdivision to defendants Dennis
Church, Jay Lewis and Ray Maag and to Douglas W. Church (R.
466), the brother of Dennis, who was not named a defendant
and had previously filed for bankruptcy.

The individual

defendants and Douglas W. Church owned and controlled defendant
Rocky Mountain which issued to Pioneer on the above loan
a lender's title insurance policy showing Pioneer in a first
position on the condominiums and in a second position on
Lake Meadows.

The policy was issued through Rocky Mountain's

-3underwriter, Title Guarantee, in the face amount of $70,000.
(R. 467-68).

The loan was renewed several times and was

in default in the fall of 1981.

(R. 480, 545). Thereafter,

in December, 1981 Pioneer purchased as an investment the
fee title to the Lake Meadows property at a foreclosure sale
by Utah Valley Bank who was in the first priority position.
(R. 564, 518). In February, 1982 Pioneer threatened to sell
the two condominiums, the remaining collateral, to collect
the debt unless Title Guarantee paid the total indebtedness
of $77*326.98, which Title Guarantee did on February 18,
1982.

(Finding No. 12, R. 424). In May, 1982 Pioneer asserted

a claim against Title Guarantee to the effect that Pioneer
was entitled to additional amounts under the policy because
of a lack of access to Lake Meadows which access Pioneer
had released in April, 1980 from its collateral.

Title

Guarantee denied the claim. (R. 691, Ex. 10). Pioneer then
brought this action alleging fraud and bad faith in regard
to the original loan and in regard to the denial of its claim.
(Second Amended Complaint, R. 210). The lower court found
all issues in favor of the defendants.

-4STATEMENT OF FACTS
The following facts are generally in chronological
order and are divided into numbered paragraphs to make
citation more convenient:
1.

Ray Maag originated the Lake Meadows subdivision,

and the property on which it was located was purchased through
Ray Maag and his wife.
2.

(R. 698).

Thereafter, Maag assigned an interest in the

property and subdivision to Jay Lewis, Douglas Church and
Dennis Church who became his partners.
3.

(R. 698).

To provide one of the road accesses to the Lake

Meadows subdivision Maag made an oral agreement with John
Taylor to obtain a 50 by 50 foot piece of Taylor's property
on which there was a conflict of title in exchange for an
equal amount of property owned by the partners.
6l4).

(R. 699-701,

The partners had already acquired an interest in the

Taylor property by reason of a tax deed some years before.
(R. 613).
4.
Taylor.

Maag told his partners about the agreement with

(R. 701).
5.

To obtain formal approval of the subdivision

plat from Provo City it was necessary to complete the documents
acquiring the Taylor access property for the Lake Meadows

-5subdivision, and because Maag was out of town and Taylor
had not then executed a deed, Douglas Church signed TaylorTs
name to a deed for TaylorTs property.
6.

(R. 571-72).

Douglas Church knew that signing Taylor's name

was wrong (R. 626) but did so as an act of expedience because
of the pressure of time and because he relied on the prior
oral agreement with Taylor.
7.

(R. 613-18).

Shortly after Provo City approved the Lake Meadows

plat in October, 1979, Pioneer loaned Douglas Church, Dennis
Church, Jay Lewis and Ray Maag $70,000 secured by a first
trust deed on two Willowbrook condominium units and a second
trust deed on Lake Meadows.

(R. 466-67).

Although

the

borrowers proposed that Lake Meadows be the security for
the loan, Pioneer insisted on the two condominiums as additional
security.
8.

(R. 515).
Kent Nelson, the officer of Pioneer who handled

the loan said Douglas Church told him that the loan was
for developing Lake Meadows.

(R. 466). However, Pioneer

did not treat the loan as a development loan.
9.

(R. 531).

Douglas Church did not disclose to Pioneer that

he had signed Taylor's name to the deed to obtain approval
of the Lake Meadows plat.

(R. 572).

-610.

Pioneer received a copy of the recorded plat

of Lake Meadows before making the loan (Re 472), and was
aware of the location of the road accesses when the loan
was made.

(R. 527).

11.

At that time3 the four borrowers were the prin-

cipals of Rocky Mountain Title.

(R. 467). The policy issued

by Rocky Mountain to Pioneer accurately stated Pioneer's
priority position in regard to Lake Meadows and the condominiums.

(Ex. 3)«

Nelson said he was aware of the difference

between an owner's and a lender's policy (R. 533) and was
experienced in making loans, taking collateral, preparing
documents, and investigating property. (R. 510A).
12.

Shortly thereafter when Taylor discovered that

Douglas Church had signed his name to the deed, he was angry
(R. 706), and demanded substantially more consideration than
under his original agreement.

(R. 708-09, 619, 662).

Negotiations with Taylor continued for many months thereafter.

(R. 710).
13.

Because no settlement was reached, Taylor commenced

a quiet title action in March, 1980 against Douglas Church,
Dennis Church, Jay Lewis, Ray Maag, Rocky Mountain Title,
and Western Home Bank (whose name was thereafter changed

-7to Pioneer), et al., and recorded a lis pendens on March
11, 1980.

(R. 717-18, Ex. 32).

14.

Although Kent Nelson testified that Pioneer

was not aware of Taylor's lawsuit and that he did not find
a copy of the summons in the file, he admitted that he was
not the registered agent for Pioneer, was not the custodian
of the file, and didn't know who, if anyone, from Pioneer
was served.

(R. 529~30).

There was no other evidence presented

by Pioneer showing lack of knowledge about or service of
the Taylor lawsuit or knowledge of the official record or
lis pendens.
15.

In April, 1980 after commencement of the Taylor

action Douglas Church asked Pioneer to reconvey the disputed
property which Pioneer did on April 8, 1980.
16.

(Ex. 5).

Nelson testified that Douglas Church told him

the property to be reconveyed did not affect Pioneer's
interest.

(R. 474). Douglas Church testified that he showed

Nelson where the property to be reconveyed was located on
the plat, told Nelson there was a quiet title action and
since the loan covered the property, a reconveyance was
needed.

(R. 612).

-817.

In August, 1981 Pioneer had filed a notice of

default against Douglas Church, Dennis Church, Jay Lewis
and Ray Maag on the $70,000 loan.
18.

(R. 545-46, Ex. 21).

In December, 1981 at the foreclosure sale of

Utah Valley Bank's first trust deed on Lake Meadows, Pioneer
purchased the fee title for $81,631.39.

(R. 486). Pioneer

did not notify Title Guarantee of the sale or purchase.
(R. 528).
19.

When Pioneer bought Lake Meadows at the fore-

closure sale of Utah Valley Bank, Pioneer thought that the
two condominium units were sufficient to pay off the debt.
(R. 517-18, 565).
20.

Although Kent Nelson testified that one of the

reasons Pioneer bought Lake Meadows was to protect its
collateral, both Nelson and Walter Davidson, president of
Pioneer, also testified that Pioneer bought with the
expectation of making a profit.

(R. 518-19, 564). Nelson

also testified that he knew Pioneer's trust deed on Lake
Meadows was extinguished when Pioneer bought at the Utah
Valley Bank sale.
21.

(R. 523).

David Hodgson, on behalf of Title Guarantee,

began investigating an alleged problem in regard to Lake

-9Meadows and the condominiums after receipt of a letter dated
January 15, 1982 from Steven Grow of Pinecrest Associates
on another policy issued by Rocky Mountain which also insured
the two condominiums.
22.

(R. 711-12, Ex. 13).

When Hodgson contacted Pioneer in late January

or early February, 1982, he was told by Davidson that Pioneer
was going to sell the condominiums if Title Guarantee did
not pay off the loan.

(R. 565, 723-24).

The condominiums

were scheduled for sale by Pioneer on March 1, 1982.
548).

(R.

Title Guarantee (Safeco) paid Pioneer $77,326.98,

the amount calculated by Pioneer for the remaining $60,000
principal loan balance plus accrued interest and fees.
(Finding No. 12, R. 424; also see R. 717, 720-21, 521).
23.

At the time the loan was paid by Title Guarantee,

Davidson proposed to Hodgson that Pioneer would sell its
ownership position in Lake Meadows that it had purchased
for $81,000 to Title Guarantee for $100,000.
24.

(R. 562, 723).

Davidson also told Hodgson that Utah County

was a "hot bed of corruption" (R. 562), and said Hodgson
told him that there were some problems and because Pioneer
was in a first position on the condominiums Title Guarantee

-10would pay the outstanding debt to Pioneer.

(R. 556).

Davidson discussed the double mortgaging of properties in
Utah County with Hodgson.

(R. 563). Hodgson said the reason

he did not discuss his preliminary discoveries about Lake
Meadows in greater detail with Davidson was because Davidson
told him that Davidson had investigated the situation, was
going to do further investigation and knew about it.

(R.

680).
25.

In May, 1982 Pioneer made a claim against Title

Guarantee because of the loss of the Taylor access property
(R. 691), and then filed suit claiming that Title Guarantee
was liable for the loss of the Taylor access property.
2).

(R.

Pioneer twice amended its complaint to allege finally

that Title Guarantee was liable for fraud in denying Pioneerfs
claim for additional amounts.
26.

(R. 210).

Jud Harward, an appraiser for Pioneer, testified

at trial that he appraised the Lake Meadows property in 1982
and determined that it had a value of $144,000, and that
his current appraisal at trial showed the same value.
762-63).

(R.

He also said he had no opinion as to what Lake

Meadows was worth without the one access.

(R. 764). He

said he checked the records two days before he testified

-11and that any diminution in value was based on his assumption
that there was no access to the property.

(R. 763)•

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

The principal elements of a title insurance loan

policy are generally (1) that the collateral as provided
in the policy is available as a source of payment on the
debt, if necessary, and (2) that the amount of insurance
is limited to the amount of the debt plus interest and expenses
of foreclosure or the face amount of the policy, whichever
is less.

Payment by Title Guarantee to Pioneer upon demand

by Pioneer of the entire amount of the principal indebtedness,
accrued interest and fees on February 17, 1982 discharged
all liability of Title Guarantee to Pioneer under the policy.
2.

Because Pioneer purchased Lake Meadows in December,

1981 as an investment when Pioneer knew that it had previously
released the Taylor access from its insured collateral,
Pioneer cannot thereafter claim that Title Guarantee is responsible for that lack of access.
3.

The lower court properly determined that Pioneer

did not prove fraud or bad faith.

There was conflicting

testimony of facts, and Pioneer's own witnesses contradict

-12Pioneer's arguments.

Payment in full of the indebtedness

and fees eliminated any claim of fraud or bad faith.

In

regard to mitigation of damages, PioneerTs own appraisal
witness on the value of Lake Meadows admittedly based his
appraisal on the wrong assumption that there was no access
whatever and then valued Lake Meadows as a subdivision the
same in 1984 as in 1982.
ARGUMENT
I.

PAYMENT TO PIONEER OP THE ENTIRE DEBT
AND PEES TERMINATED TITLE GUARANTEE'S
PAYMENT OBLIGATIONS UNDER ITS LENDERfS
POLICY.

The provisions of the lender's policy determine the
contractual liability of Title Guarantee, which liability
cannot be increased unless some independent fraud or bad
faith is proven.

The policy describes the status of the

collateral listed as security for the loan and states that
the maximum amount of liability shall not exceed the least
of (a) the total indebtedness, or (b) the face amount of
the policy which in this case was $70,000.
Pioneer argues that because Pioneer made no specific
claim against the policy as of February 17, 1982 when Pioneer
demanded and received $77,326.98, which payment was the full

-13amount of the principal indebtedness, interest and fees
as calculated by Pioneer, Pioneer still has coverage of the
$70,000 face amount of the policy.

Pioneer contends that

Title Guarantee made the February, 1982 payment as a result
of other policies and thus there was no claim or payment
made under Pioneer?s policy.

Pioneer specifically relies

on paragraph 2(a) of the Conditions and Stipulations in the
policy which provision applies to the continuation of insurance
in a case where the insured lender acquires fee titleparagraph 2(a) there are two major elements, i.e.,

Under

(1) the

continuation of insurance, and (2) the insurer's limits of
liability.

Pioneer does not acknowledge that full payment

to Pioneer affects the limits of liability but instead
emphasizes the continuation of insurance after ownership
was acquired.
Such an argument is based on a misunderstanding
of the limitations of the policy.

The applicable provisions

of paragraph 2(a) clearly limit the amount of coverage notwithstanding the continuation of coverage.

Paragraph 2(a)

states as follows:
2. (a) Continuation of Insurance after
Acquisition of Title.
This policy shall continue in force as of
Date of Policy in favor of an insured who

-14acquires all or any part of the estate or interest
in the land described in Schedule A by foreclosure,
trusteefs sale, conveyance in lieu of foreclosure,
or other legal manner which discharges the lien of
the insured mortgage, . . . provided that the amount
of insurance hereunder after such acquisition, exclusive of costs, attorneys1 fees and expenses which
the Company may become obligated to pay,, shall not
exceed the least of:
(i)
A; [or]

the amount of insurance stated in Schedule

(ii) the amount of the unpaid principal of the
indebtedness as defined in paragraph 8 hereof, plus
interest thereon, expenses of foreclosure and amounts
advanced to protect the lien of the insured mortgage
and secured by said insured mortgage at the time
of acquisition of such estate or interest in the
land; . . .
Pioneer also cites paragraph 2(b) as support for
its position, but by its terms said paragraph only applies
to situations where the insured not only had acquired title
but had then conveyed the property to a third person.

Since

Pioneer retained the Lake Meadows property, paragraph 2(b)
is not applicable.'
In any case, neither paragraph 2(a) nor 2(b) increases
the liability of Title Guarantee beyond the payment of the
indebtedness.

Pioneer admits that Title Guarantee paid the

total amount of the indebtedness on February 17, 19^2 as
calculated and demanded by Pioneer.

Even if Pioneer's demand

-15or threat of sale in February, 1982 is not considered to
be a claim against the policy, and Pioneer's only claim was
made in May, 1982, Pioneer still would not have received
more in May, 1982 than it did in February, 1982.

The timing

of the payment had no effect on the limits of coverage.
The other applicable provisions of the policy also
limit the coverage to the amount of indebtedness, if any.
Paragraph 6(a) of the policy states as follows:
6.

Determination and Payment of Loss.

(a) The liability of the Company under this
policy shall in no case exceed the least of:
(i)

the actual loss of the insured claimant;

or
(ii) the amount of insurance stated in
Schedule A, or, if applicable, the amount of
insurance as defined in paragraph 2(a) hereof;
or
(iii) the amount of the indebtedness secured
by the insured mortgage as determined under
paragraph 8 hereof, at the time the loss or
damage insured against hereunder occurs,
together with interest thereon. . . .
In addition, paragraph 8(a) provides that " . . .
Payment in full by any person . . . shall terminate all liability
of the Company except as provided in paragraph 2(a) hereof
. . ."

As discussed above, paragraph 2(a) does not increase

-16the amount of coverage, beyond the stated limits.

Paragraph

11 states that claims of loss are limited to the provisions,
conditions and stipulations of the policy.
PioneerTs claim under the policy in May, 1982 is
for an alleged defect in the title, i.e., the lack of the
Taylor access.

In such instances, the damage cannot exceed

the face amount of the policy.

Annot.: Title Insurance -

Amount of Recovery, 60 A.L.R. 2d 972, 976.
A number of the cases cited by Pioneer are contained
in the above annotation.

None of the cited cases involve

situations wherein the insurer paid off the entire debt to
the insured prior to the time a formal claim was made on
the policy.

None of the cases involve a situation where

the insured released a portion of the collateral and then
acquired fee title to the collateral all of which Pioneer
did without notifying Title Guarantee.

Most of the cases

cited by Pioneer in support of its various arguments either
do not involve title insurance or merely state general principles which are not applicable to this case: i.e.,
American Republic Life Ins. Co. v. Claybough, 3 02 S.W. 2d
545 (Ark. 1957) (health and accident policy); Stone v. Waters,
483 S.W. 2d 639 (Mo. 1972) (automobile policy);

Dillingham

-17Corp. v. Employers Mutual Liability Ins. Co. of Wisconsin,
503 P.2d 1181 (9th Cir. 1974) (liability policy); Armstrong
v. Hanover Ins. Co., 289 A.2d 669 (Vt. 1972) (automobile
policy); McLaughlin v. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co.,
565 P. Supp. 434 (N.D. Cal.1983) (medical policy); Gordon
v. Bialystaker Center & Bikur Cholem, Inc., 385 N.E. 2d 285
(N.Y. 1978) (fraudulent transfer); Glickman v. New York Life
Ins. Co., 107 P.2d 252 (Cal. 1940) (life policy); Deios v.
Farmers Ins. Group, Inc., 155 Cal. Rptr. 843 (1979) (automobile policy); St. Joseph Hospital v. Corbetta Construction
Co., Inc., 316 N.E. 2d 51 (111. 1974) (construction dispute);
Ammerman v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 19 Utah 2d 26l, 430 P.2d
576 (1967) (automobile policy); Bowen v. Olson, 576 P.2d 862
(Utah 1978) (specific performance of land contract); Blodgett
v. Martsch, 590 P.2d 298 (Utah 1978) (question of confidential
relationship); B & R Supply Co. v. Bringhurst, 28 Utah 2d
442, 503 P.2d 1216 (1972) (implied authority of agent);
Crisci v. Security Ins. Co. of New Haven

Connecticut, 426

P.2d 173 (Cal. 1967) (liability policy); Mammas v. Oro Valley
Townhouses, Inc., 638 P.2d 1367 (AZ 1981) (claim of fraud);
Perry v. McConkie, 1 Utah 2d 189, 264 P.2d 852 (1953)
(fiduciary relationship); Stevens

v. Marco, 305 P.2d 669

-18(Cal. 1957) (fiduciary relationship); Pratt v. Board of Education
of the Uintah County School District, 564 P.2d 294 (Utah 1977)
(employee relationship); Utah Farm Bureau Mutual Ins. Co. v.
Orville Andrews & Sons, 665 P.2d 1308 (Utah 1983) (farm liability
policy); Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 510 P.2d 1032 (Cal.
1973) (fire policy).
In another case cited by Pioneer involving an owner's
title insurance policy where the issue was the amount of
damages when title to a portion of the insured property failed,
Hartman v. Shambaugh, 630 P.2d 758 (N.M. 198l), the Supreme
Court of New Mexico held that the insured was entitled to
recover his "actual loss" up to the face amount of the policy.
Also see Couch On Insurance 2d, §57 :l88.

Although the policy

in this case was a lender's policy, the same restriction on
damages applies.

Because there was no loss to Pioneer on

the insured loan Pioneer had no loss under the policy even
if the "insurance" under the policy continued

because of

Pioneer's purchase.
There is yet another reason why Pioneer cannot prevail.
If it were concluded that Pioneer received no payment under
the policy and the $77,326.98 payment was merely gratuitous,

-19as Pioneer argues, then Pioneer would be unjustly enriched.
If Pioneer is not willing to give Title Guarantee credit for
the February, 1982 payment because Pioneer had, as it argues,
not then made a formal claim, Pioneer is still not entitled
to ignore the payment.

The fact that another personTs claim

was cleared up by the payment does not mean that Pioneer was
not paid.

Pioneer demanded and received the entire insured

debt owed by the Church brothers, Lewis and Maag.

At the

very least under such circumstances the law implies a contract and requires credit for the payment.
§6.

17 C.J.S. Contracts

Also see Fowler v. Taylor, 554 P.2d 205 (Utah 1976) wherein

the doctrine of unjust enrichment is acknowledged.
no circumstance

Under

would Pioneer have been entitled to more

in February, 1982 than it in fact received.
II.

PIONEER CAUSED ITS OWN ALLEGED DAMAGE BY
VOLUNTARILY ACQUIRING FEE TITLE TO LAKE
MEADOWS AS AN INVESTMENT IN DECEMBER,
1981 WHICH ACQUISITION PIONEER MADE EVEN
THOUGH PIONEER KNEW IT HAD EARLIER
RELEASED THE TAYLOR ACCESS IN 1980.

In addition to the fact that the provisions of the
policy do not support Pioneer?s contentions, there is
another reason why Pioneer is wrong.

Even if it is

-2 0assumed that Pioneer made no claim against the policy in
February, 1982, and also assumed that Title Guarantee wrongly
failed at that time to disclose that Douglas Church had signed
Taylorfs name, there is still no connection between those
assumptions and PioneerTs claimed damage.

It is clear that

the source of "Pioneerfs damage, if any, was Pioneer's own
intentional purchase of Lake Meadows as an investment at the
Utah Valley Bank sale in December, 1981 which purchase was
with the knowledge that Pioneer had previously reconveyed
the Taylor access in April, 1980.

Pioneer did not notify

Title Guarantee at the times of the release of the Taylor
access, the Taylor lawsuit and lis pendens, or Pioneer's
purchase of Lake Meadows.
III.

BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT RESOLVED DISPUTED
EVIDENCE AGAINST PIONEER IN REGARD TO ITS
ALLEGATIONS OF FRAUD, BAD FAITH AND THE
VALUE OF LAKE MEADOWS, PIONEER WAS NOT
ENTITLED TO PREVAIL ON THOSE ISSUES.

In Finding of Fact No. 19 (R. 426) the trial court
determined that Pioneer had presented no persuasive evidence
of malice, bad faith or fraud by Title Guarantee.

The trial

court also concluded that Title Guarantee was not liable for
malice, bad faith, fraud or breach of contract, and that the

-21individual defendants did not intend to defraud Pioneer.
Conclusions of Law Nos. 3-5 (R. 427). There is substantial
evidence to support the trial court's Findings and Conclusions.
The one person, Douglas Church, who Pioneer claims was
involved in all of the alleged fraudulent actions and misrepresentations or omissions was not even a defendant in this
case.
trial.

Pioneer dismissed Ray Maag as a defendant prior to
(R. 257-58).
Pioneer's argument that Hodgson on behalf of Title

Guarantee knowingly concealed facts from Pioneer is unfair
and contrary to the Findings of the trial court.

At the time

Hodgson first talked with Nelson and Davidson after January
15y 1982 about the problem, Pioneer had been involved over
an extended period of time in a number of transactions which
were of record and any reasonable person would assume that
Pioneer was fully aware of the situation.

There is no question

that Pioneer signed the reconveyance of the Taylor access
nearly two years before Hodgson knew about it.

Pioneer had

filed its notice of default on the Lake Meadows obligation
in the fall, 1981 and had purchased Utah Valley Bank's
position in December, 1981.

Davidson told Hodgson that

Pioneer had done some investigation, that Utah Valley was

-22a hot bed of corruption, that Pioneer purchased Lake
Meadows as an investment, that Pioneer would not sell
Lake Meadows to Title Guarantee unless Pioneer were paid
an additional $20,000 over the amount Pioneer had paid
and that Pioneer intended to sell the two condominiums
unless Title Guarantee paid the insured obligation in full
prior to March 1, 1982.

Pioneer also knew that the two

Willowbrook Hills condominiums had been double mortgaged and
that Title Guarantee was obligated to clear up the problem.
Also Pioneer did not present persuasive evidence that it did
not know about the Taylor lawsuit or the Lis Pendens.

Doug

Church testified that he told Nelson of the Taylor action.
Under the above facts, the trial court properly concluded that Pioneer was fully informed and that nothing was
intentionally or unintentionally concealed from Pioneer by
Title Guarantee.

There is no evidence that Title Guarantee

was informed of any problem in regard to Lake Meadows prior
to January 15, 1982.

Pioneer attempts to rely on a statement

by Doug Church that he may have contacted Title Guarantee
in 1980.

Church corrected that statement by testifying that

he did not talk to Title Guarantee until after he was contacted by Hodgson.

(See R. 604-05).

It is uncontradicted

-23that Hodgson did not begin his investigation until after
January 15, 1982.

In addition, there was no evidence of

any fraud or misrepresentation on the part of Rocky
Mountain who was only the agent of Title Guarantee for
issuing policies.

(See R. 608-09).

If there were any

misrepresentations to Pioneer they could only have been made
by Doug Church or Jay Lewis in their individual capacities
and not reasonably within the scope of their authority from
Rocky Mountain and certainly not from Title Guarantee because
neither Church nor Lewis was an agent of Title Guarantee.
The trial court properly determined that Pioneer
did not present persuasive evidence of any knowledge by Title
Guarantee and certainly not of fraud which must be shown by
clear and convincing evidence.

Universal C.I.T. Credit

Corporation v. Sohm, 15 Utah 2d 262, 391 P.2d 293 (1964);
Pace v. Parrish, 122 Utah 141, 247 P.2d 273 (1952).

To impute

fraud to a principal it must be shown that the acts complained
of were within the scope of the agent's authority.
Couch on Insurance 2d, §26:437.

See

Title Guarantee clearly

demonstrated its good faith when it honored its contract and
paid Pioneer the entire debt in February, 1982 when Pioneer

-24threatened to sell the two condominiums if it was not
paid.
Pioneer made no objection to any evidence of lack
of notice at trial and even if there had been an objection
it would not change the fact that Pioneer had taken action
and participated in prior events and had purchased the Lake
Meadows property (presumably after some investigation)
without ever once contacting Title Guarantee.

In fact,

the first contact between Title Guarantee and Pioneer was
made by Hodgson after January 15, 1982.

Certainly nothing

that Pioneer did or participated in prior to January 15, 1982
such as reconveying the Taylor access property or purchasing
Lake Meadows can be blamed on Title Guarantee.

Under those

circumstances, Pioneer's argument that Title Guarantee waived
defenses is untenable.

See Vol. l6C5 Appieman: Insurance

Law & Practice Ch. 324, §9261 wherein it is stated:
The general rule has grown up that in order
for the insured to claim a waiver or estoppel
to rely upon particular defenses by a denial of
liability upon a different ground, it must be
shown that he was lulled into security by the
company's action so that it would be unfair to
permit the defense, or that there was a change
of position or prejudicial reliance thereon.
In addition, Rule 54(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
provides that "every final judgment shall grant the relief

-25//hose favor It i:i rendered is entitled".
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-26CONCLUSION
At all times Title Guarantee dealt with Pioneer in good
faith.

Title Guarantee had no knowledge until after January

15, 1982 of any fact in this case except the issuing of the
policy.

At the very least, by December, 1981 Pioneer had

knowingly reconveyed a portion of the insured access and then
knowingly purchased Lake Meadows in fee as an investment without
that access.

At the same time Pioneer scheduled a sale of

its remaining collateral to collect its loan, and when first
contacted by Title Guarantee Pioneer threatened to sell its
remaining collateral unless the entire debt were paid.

Title

Guarantee promptly paid Pioneer more than the limits of the
policy.

Such payment extinguished any policy obligation as

was determined by the trial court.

Pioneer simply misunder-

stands the policy limits.
Par from presenting clear and convincing evidence of
fraud or bad faith, the testimony of Pioneer's own witnesses
contradicts its present arguments.

Moreover,

payment by

Title Guarantee certainly eliminates such claims.

In any case

the trial court resolved disputed facts against Pioneer in
regard to all issues and Pioneer is not entitled to prevail
on those claims.

-27Th e judgment of the trial court la correct and should
be affirmed.
DATED this 21st day •? "?r-, l~0r"\
Respec fc.fu]'" ° emitted,

Walter P.'Faber., jr.
attorney fcr Tl^le Guarantee
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of the 27th of July, no closing written arguments had been received
by the Court and the Court on checking the Clerk's Office found that
all of the closing arguments in writing had been submitted to the
Clerk's Office with plaintiffs1 having been stamped in the 27th
of June and defendants1 the 11th and 6th of July with the final
response by the plaintiff the 12th of July.

All of these closing

arguments in writing were in a backer in the Clerk's Office and
of course had not been forwarded to the Court, thus causing the delay
in preparation of this written Memorandum Decision.
The Court after reviewing all of the written closing arguments,
the applicable cases, the exhibits 1 through 32 as received and
the notes taken by the Court at the time of

the trial now makes and

enters its Memorandum Decision as follows.
The Court finds that the loan of $70,000 which was taken out
by defendants Church, Lewis and Maag was for the purpose of development of a subdivision in Provo, Utah called the Lake Meadows Subdivision in part and to assist in the business of

Rocky Mountain Title

and Abstract Company which defendants Church, Lewis and Maag were
the principal officers of.

The loan of $70,000 was given to defen-

dants by Pioneer State Bank (the plaintiff) and to secure this loan
the bank took a second trust deed on the Lake Meadows property which
second position was inferior to Utah Valley Bank and Trust's first
position.

As additional collateral the plaintiff, Pioneer, required

two condominiums in the Willowbrook Hills area.

Both the Lake

Meadows property and the Willowbrook Hills condominium property
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At this juncture the bank had in its possession $77,326.98 in
cash as a result of the Safeco policy on the condominiums as well as
the Lake Meadows property which according to the bank's expert witness without two accesses was worth $36,000.00 as an undeveloped
raw ground area.

The bank's expert, Mr. Harward, also testified

as to this value and also testified that he did not know that the
property might not be developed as a plcinned subdivision by securing
another access area other than the one which had been denied to the
original developers and defendants in this case by Mr. John Taylor.
Further, on direct testimony the bank's own operating officer indicat
that he did not know whether or not the bank had been served in the
quiet title action brought by Mr. Taylor against the defendants herei
when he discovered that his name had been forged to a deed conveying
to defendants herein whatever interest he had in the access.

The

defendants have continually maintained that they acquired the access
by way of a tax sale and that John Taylorfs interest was agreed upon
and had been promised to them in exchange for certain lots in the sub
division which Mr. Taylor then renigged on and set a price which the
developers could not meet.
Based on the foregoing then it is this Court's finding as a
matter of fact that the bank has expended $151,639.31 and received
value by way of payment from defendant Title Guarantee Company and
value by way of possession of the Lake Meadows property of $113,326.9
leaving the bank on the short end to the sum of $38,312.33.

In addi-

tion the bank claims that they are out the amount of the tax liabilit
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The Court fails to see that defendants Church and Lewis
defrauded the bank and that the representations which had been made
to the bank by defendant Church were in fact true.

Further, the

Court finds no fraud by either defendants Church or Lewis on the
grounds that the bank did not suffer any damage as a result of their
representations nor did they have the necessary intent or knowledge
to make the representations to the bank that the bank plaintiff herein
alleges.
The bank as knowledgeable investor purchased the Lake Meadows
property with an intent to utilize their position to their own advantage as an investor and in fact their principal operating officer
testified at the trial indicated that it was their intent to purchase
the property as an investment and the fact that as a subdivision the
property has decreased in value without the second access so that the
bank now stands to lose as a net loss some $38,312.33 cannot and will
not be adjusted by this Court on any of the grounds alleged.

The

Court further feels that the issue of unjust enrichment as alleged
by Title Guarantee Company need not be addressed under the analysis
set forth heretofore by this Court and that based on all of the
information obtained at the time of trial, the applicable law and
facts as indicated in this Memorandum Decision the Court finds against
the bank and in favor of these defendants, no cause for action.
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FILED IN CLERKS OFFICE
Salt Uke County Utah

OCT 1 9 1 9 8 4
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT?* I»
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH
PIONEER STATE BANK,
a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs,
DENNIS G. CHURCH, JAY E. LEWIS,
RAY M. MAAG, ROCKY MOUNTAIN
TITLE & ABSTRACT COMPANY, a
Utah corporation, THE TITLE
GUARANTEE COMPANY, a
corporation,

Civil No, C-82-8350

JUDGE DAVID B. DEE

Defendants,

The above-captioned matter came on regularly for non-jury
trial on June 20 and 21, 1984 before the Court, the Honorable David
B. Dee, District Judge, presiding, plaintiff being represented by
its counsel, Richard D. Burbidge, Esq., defendants Dennis G. Church,
Jay E. Lewis and Rocky Mountain Title & Abstract Company being represented by their counsel, Frederick A. Jackman, Esq,, defendant The
Title Guarantee Company being represented by its counsel, Walter P.
Faber, Jr., Esq., and defendant Ray M. Maag having been dismissed as
a defendant prior to trial and not appearing as a party, and the
parties having introduced evidence, having rested, and thereafter
having submitted written closing arguments as requested by the Court,

4»1

-2and the Court after having reviewed the written closing arguments,
the applicable cases, Exhibits 1 through 32, and the notes taken
by the Court at the time of trial, and being fully advised in the
premises, and having made and entered its Memorandum Decision hereby
makes the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The loan of $70,000 which was taken out by one Douglas

W. Church and the named individual defendants Church, Lewis and
Maag, was for the purpose of development of a subdivision in Provo,
Utah called the Lake Meadows Subdivision, and also to assist in the
business of Rocky Mountain Title & Abstract Company of which the
said Douglas W. Church and defendants Church, Lewis and Maag were
the principal officers.
2.

Douglas W. Church actively participated in negotiations)

for said loan but was not named by plaintiff as a defendant in the
case.
3.

The loan of $70,000 was given by plaintiff to Douglas

W. Church and defendants Church, Lewis and Maag, and to secure this
loan plaintiff took a Second Trust Deed on the Lake Meadows property
which second position was inferior to Utah Valley Bank & Trust's
first position.
4.

As additional collateral for the loan, plaintiff

required two condominiums in the Willowbrook Hills area.

(SB&

-35.

Both the Lake Meadows property and the Willowbrook

Hills condominium property were insured by defendant Title Guarantee
under a title policy for $70,000 issued through defendant Rocky
Mountain to plaintiff.
6.

Subsequent to the loan of $70,000 the Lake Meadows

Subdivision property ran into difficulty in that the second exit and
entrance which was required by Provo City as a condition precedent
to qualifying the plat was not available to Douglas W. Church and
the individual defendants though

they thought they had purchased

the ground in question through a tax sale and that it merely had a
cloud on it because of the interest of one John Taylor and his wife.
7.

To initially qualify the plat with Provo City and

clear up the cloud on the title to the one access, Douglas W. Church
signed Mr. and Mrs. Taylors1 names to a deed for the Taylors1
interest without the Taylors1 consent although Douglas W. Church
believed the Taylors had previously agreed to the transaction.
8.

The access problem was not disclosed to plaintiff at

the time of the loan and plaintiff was thereafter induced by Douglas
W. Church to reconvey a portion of the property of the Lake Meadows
Subdivision so that a reconveyance could be made to the Taylors as
a result of the Taylors having brought a quiet title action against
Douglas W. Church and the individual defendants and also named
plaintiff as a defendant.

-49.

Although plaintiff was a named defendant in the

Taylor's quiet title action and a Lis Pendens had been recorded in
the spring of 1980, on direct testimony plaintiff's own operating
officer indicated that he did not know whether or not plaintiff had
been served in the Taylors' quiet title action which the Taylors
started after they discovered that their names had been forged to a
deed conveying to Douglas W. Church and the individual defendants
whatever interest the Taylors had in the access.
10.

The defendants have continually maintained that they

acquired the disputed access area by way of a tax sale and that
trade of the Taylors' interest was agreed upon and had been promised
to them in exchange for certain lots in the subdivision which the
Taylors then reneged on and set a price which the developers could
not meet.
11.

Thereafter, in December, 19 81, at a foreclosure sale

of the Lake Meadows property under the first Trust Deed by Utah
Valley Bank, plaintiff voluntarily purchased for investment the
Lake Meadows property at the Utah Valley sale for the sum of
$81,631.30.

As of this time, plaintiff had not notified Title

Guarantee of the sale or any of the problems or made any claim on
the title policy.
12.

In February, 1982 under plaintiff's threat of sale of

-5the two condominiums which plaintiff acknowledged were adequate
security for the collateral of $70,000 which had been loaned to
Douglas W. Church and the individual defendants, Title Guarantee paid]
to plaintiff the sum of $77,326. §8 which was the total amount of the
obligation and which exceeded the amount of the title policy covering)
the $70,000 loan, said amount being $60,000 principal on the condominiums, $16,738.05 interest, and $588.93 in costs, fees and
expenses.
13.

At the same time plaintiff offered to sell to Title

Guarantee the Lake Meadows property it had purchased for some
$81,000 for the higher sum of $100,000, thereby attempting to obtain
a $20,000 increase in the sales transaction.
14.

At this juncture plaintiff had in its possession

$77,326.98 in cash as a result of the title policy on the condominiums as well as the Lake Meadows property which according to
plaintiff's expert witness without two accesses was worth $36,000
as an undeveloped raw ground area.
15.

Plaintiff's expert, Mr. Harward, also testified as

to this value and also testified that he did not know that the
property might not be developed as a planned subdivision by securing
another access area other than the one which had been denied to
the original developers and defendants in this case by the Taylors.
16.

Plaintiff has expended $151,6 39.31 and received

4?5

-6value by way of payment from defendant Title Guarantee Company and
value by way of possession of the Lake Meadows property of $113,326.9)8
leaving plaintiff on the short end to the sum of $38,312.33.
17.

Although plaintiff claims it is out the amount of the

tax liability on Lake Meadows as a subdivision rather than the amount)
of the tax liability which might be assessed on the property as
agricultural land, the Court finds that based on the position that
plaintiff obtained by way of purchase of the Utah Valley Bank's
first position on the property that the tax liability is the sum
testified to by Mr. Harward as being $700.00 annually rather than
the sum if taxed as a subdivision of $31,250.
18.

The Court finds that though

the payment by Title

Guarantee on the policy involving the Willowbrook Hills condominiums
was not payment on the policy which was given to the bank in covering]
their $70,000 loan, nevertheless, the bank is the party who insisted
on the condominiums as additional collateral to the subdivision and
payment on one policy in satisfaction of an obligation outstanding
to the same lender by the same title company discharges that obligation and the argument of the bank that no claim

has been made on

the initial policy on Lake Meadows, this Court finds without merit.
19.

Plaintiff presented no persuasive evidence of malice,

bad faith or fraud on the part of Title Guarantee.

4?&

-7CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The Court has jurisdiction over the parties and this

2.

The representations made by Douglas W, Church and the

case.

individual defendants to plaintiff were in fact true and not
fraudulent,
3.

Title Guarantee did not breach its contract and was

not guilty of malice, bad faith or fraud toward plaintiff,
4.

Plaintiff suffered no damage as a result of any

representations made to it.
5.

The individual defendants did not have the necessary

intent or knowledge on which fraud against plaintiff could be based.
6.

Plaintiff was a knowledgeable investor who purchased

Lake Meadows at the Utah Valley Bank sale for an investment.
7.

The Court finds that though the payment by Title

Guarantee on the policy involving the Willowbrook Hills condominiums
was not payment on the policy which was given to the bank in covering!
their $70,000 loan, nevertheless, the bank is the party who insisted
on the condominiums as additional collateral to the subdivision and
payment on one policy in satisfaction of an obligation outstanding
to the same lender by the same title company discharges that obligation and the argument of the bank that no claim has been made on

4*?

-8the initial policy on Lake Meadows, this Court finds without merit.
8.

Plaintiff has not taken any steps to mitigate its

damage by way of the obligation to look into the prospect of developing the subdivision with another area to be obtained as an access
nor has it done anything to minimize or mitigate its tax liability
as indicated might be done by its own expert but to the contrary has
attempted by way of buying in the first mortgagee's position to
obtain for investment a property which it contemplated would be
greatly increased in value and cannot now complain about a decrease
in value,
9.

Defendants are entitled to judgment against plaintiff
/I

on all claims no cause for action.
DATED this

IW

day of

AZ^jf^^

* 1984.

BY THE COURT:

ATTEST

APPROVED AS TO FORM

H. DIXON htNDLEY

Date:
DspLty Cterk

( c o n t . on page 9)
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(cont.)
Date:

-9October 3, 1984

F r e d e r i c k A. Jaoxman

Date:

/&/3/7

^

c

f

W a l t e r P. F a b e r , J

r

.
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RICHARD D. BURBIDGE, Esq., #0492
STEPHEN B. MITCHELL, Esq., #2278
BURBIDGE * MITCHELL
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Elks Building
139 East South Temple, Suite 2001
a l t Lake City, Utah 84111
801 355-6677

Salt Lake County Utah

NOV

9,1984
Deputy Clerk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
PIONEER STATE BANK, a Utah
corporation,

JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.
DENNIS G. CHURCH, et al.,

Civil No. C 82-8350
David B. Dee, Judge

Defendants.

The above-captioned matter came on regularly for non-jury trial on
June 20 and 21, 1984, before the Court, the Honorable David B. Dee, District
Judge, presiding, Plaintiff being represented by its counsel, Richard D.
Burbidge, Defendants Dennis G. Church, Jay E. Lewis and Rocky Mountain Title
S Abstract Company bbeing represented by their counsel, Frederick A.
Jackman, Defendant The Title Guarantee Company being represented by its
counsel, Walter P. Faber, J r . , and Defendant Ray M. Maag having been
dismissed as a Defendant prior to t r i a l and not appearing as a party, and
the parties having introduced evidence, having rested, and thereafter having
submitted written closing arguments as requested by the Court, and the Court
after having reviewed the written closing arguments, the applicable cases,
Exhibits 1 through 32, and the notes taken by the Court at the time of
t r i a l , being fully advised in the premises, having made and entered its

44E

Memorandum Decision and having made and filed Findings of Fact and
onclusions of Law, ordered that Judgment be entered in accordance therewith
as follows:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that:
1.

Defendants have Judgment against Plaintiff on Plaintiff's

Complaint, no cause for action,
2.

Defendants
i u^ are
a r c awarded
a w a r u c u their
t n t r i r taxable
i,dAciuie costs.
LUbub.

DATED this

rf

da

y

of

^%Kv

, 1984.

BY THE COURT:

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the foregoing Judgment was mailed
to Walter P. Faber, Jr. of Watkins 4 Faber, 2102 East 3300 South, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84109, Defendants Dennis Church, 656 Autumn Circle, Elkridge,
Utah 84660, Jay Lewis, 476 West 700 South, Orem, Utah 84058, on the J2_
day of November, 1984.
/x-.
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POLICY OF TITLE INSURANCE
issued by

The Title Guarantee Company
BALTIMORE, MARYLAND 21202
3JECT TO THE EXCLUSIONS FROM COVERAGE, THE EXCEPTIONS CONTAINED IN SCHEDULE B AND THE PRO[IONS OF THE CONDITIONS AND STIPULATIONS HEREOF, THE TITLE GUARANTEE COMPANY, a Maryland
poration, herein called the Company, insures, as of Date of Policy shown in Schedule A, against loss or damage, not exceeding the !
>unt of insurance stated in Schedule A, and costs, attorneys' fees and expenses which the Company may become obligated to pay
Kinder, sustained or incurred by the insured by reason of:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Title to the estate or interest described in Schedule A being vested otherwise than as stated therein;
Any defect in or lien or encumbrance on such title;
Lack of a right of access to and from the land;
Unmarketability of such title;
The invalidity or unenforceability of the lien of the insured mortgage upon said estate or interest except to the extent that
such invalidity or unenforceability, or claim thereof, arises out of the transaction evidenced by the insured mortgage and is
based upon
a. usury, or
b. any consumer credit protection or truth in lending law ;
6. The priority of any lien or encumbrance over the lien of the insured mortgage;
7. Any statutory lien for labor or material which now has gained or hereafter may gain priority over the lien of the insured mortgage, except any such lien arising from an improvement on the land contracted for and commenced subsequent to Date of
Policy not financed in whole or in part by proceeds of the indebtedness secured by the insured mortgage which at Date of
Policy the insured has advanced or is obligated to advance; or
8. The invalidity or unenforceability of any assignment, shown in Schedule A, of the insured mortgage or the failure of said assignment to vest title to the insured mortgage in the named insured assignee free and clear of all liens.
EXCLUSIONS FROM COVERAGE

e following matters are expressly excluded from the coverage of this policy:
1. Any law, ordinance or governmental regulation (including but not limited to building and zoning ordinances) restricting ot
regulating or prohibiting the occupancy, use or enjoyment of the land, or regulating the character, dimensions or location of
any improvement now or hereafter erected on the land, or prohibiting a separation in ownership or a reduction in the dimensions or area of the land, or the effect of any violation of any such law, ordinance or governmental regulation.
2. Rights of eminent domain or governmental rights of police power unless notice of the exercise of such rights appears in the
public records at Date of Policy.
3. Defects, liens, encumbrances, adverse claims, or other matters (a) created, suffered, assumed or agreed to by the insured claimant; (b) not known to the Company and not shown by the public records but known to the insured claimant either at Date of
Policy or at the date such claimant acquired an estate or interest insured by this policy or acquired the insured mortgage and
not disclosed in writing by the insured claimant to the Company prior to the date such insured claimant became an insured
hereunder; (c) resulting in no loss or damage to the insured claimant; (d) attaching or created subsequent to Date of Policy
(except to the extent insurance is afforded herein as to any statutory lien for labor or material).
4. Unenforceability of the lien of the insured mortgage because of failure of the insured at Date of Policy or of any subsequent
owner of the indebtedness to comply with applicable "doing business" laws of the state in which the land is situated.

s

WITNESS WHEREOF, the Company has caused this policy to be signed and sealed, to become valid when countersigned by a
[dating officer or agent of the Company, all in accordance with its By-Laws.

The Title Guarantee Company

Issued by
ROCKY MOUNTAIN TITLE & ABSTRACT COMPANY

President
ATTEST :

/ j
This policy valid only if Schedules A and B are attached

Secretary

(/jjj

POLICY NUMBER:
18640
m

SCHEDULE B

This policy does not insure against loss or damage by reason of the following:
PART

I

l. Taxes or assessments which are not shown as existing liens by the records of any taxing authority that levies
taxes or assessments on real property or by the public records.
2. Any facts, rights, interests, or claims which are not shown by the public records but which could be ascertained
by an inspection of said land or by making inquiry of persons in possession thereof.
3. Easements, claims of easement or encumbrances which are not shown by the public records.
4. Discrepancies, conflicts in boundary lines, shortage in area, encroachments, or any other facts which a correct
survey would disclose, and which are not shown by the public records.
5. Unpatented mining claims; reservations or exceptions in patents or in Acts authorizing the issuance thereof; water
rights, claims or title to water.
6. Possible unfiled mechanics' and materialmen's liens.
7. The dower, curtesy, homestead, community property, or other statutory marital rights, if any, of the spouse of any
individual Insured.

PART II

1.

Taxes for the year 1979 new due and payable but will not become
delinquent until Ndvember 30, 1979.

2.

Any Special Assessments levied for the year 1979 are shown current,
but this Policy does not insure against possible future Assessments
levied for the balance of the year 1979 and subsequent years.

3.

AFFECTS PARCEL 1: An Easement over and across
August 7, 1978 and executed by CLAVIN GRAY and
favor of UTAH Power and light company recorded
as Entry No. 39800 in Book 1685 at page 711 of

4.

AFFECTS PARCELS 2 and 3: Annual maintenance assessments, special
maintenance assessments penalties, administrative assessments
and interest or costs unpaid which may have been levied or assessed
by willowbrook hill condominiums homeowners association.

5.

AFFECTS PARCEL 1: A Deed of Trust, executed by DOUGLAS W. CHURCH,
DENNIS G. CHURCH, JAY E. LEWIS, RAY M. MAAC as Trustor, to secure
/cj payment of a note bearing even date thereof in the sum of $65,000.00
with interest thereon, payable as therein provided, to UTAH VALLEY
'<
BANK, as Trustee, in favor of UTAH VALLEY BANK, as Beneficiary,
recorded May 11, 1979 as Entry No. 18090 of Official Records.

6.

Rights of way for any roads, ditches, canals, or transmission
lines new existing over, under, or across said property.
* *** * *** *

Countersigned:

s

said property,
HELEN GRAY, in
October 3, 1978
Official Records.

Validating Officer or Agent

The Title Guarantee Company

POLICY NUMBER

MU

18640

VALID ONLY IF SCHEDULES A & B ARE
ATTACHED TO ALTA LOAN POLICY-FORM M-3-1970

Order
r No. O-46201-U
0-

DATE OF POLICY-

November 1 9 , 1979a t 11:44 P.M.

SCHEDULE A
NAME OF INSURED

THE TOTAL CHARGE FOR THIS
POLICY INCLUDING RISK PREMIUM IS $ 1 8 9 . 0 0
AMOUNT

, 70,000.00

WESTEFN HOME BANK

1.

The estate or interest tn the land identified in this Schedule and which is encumbered by the insured mortgage is.

Fee Simple
2.

The estate or interest referred to herein is at Date of Policy vested in

DOUGLAS W. CHURCH, DENNIS G. CHURCH, JAY E. LEWIS, and RAY M. MA£G

3.

The mortgage, herein referred to as the insured mortgage, and the assignments thereof, if any, are described as follows:

A*x
%q
Mj«>
^

A Deed of Trust dated October 4 , 1979, executed by DOUGLAS W. CHURCH
DENNIS G. CHURCH, JAY E. LEWIS, and RAY M. MAAG a s T r u s t o r , t o
secure payment of a note bearing even d a t e thereof i n t h e sum of
$70,000.00 with interest thereon, payable as therein provided, to
WESTERN HOME BANK, a s T r u s t e e , in favor of WESTEFN HOME BANK, a Utah
Corporation, a s Beneficiary, recorded Noveirtoer 1 9 , 1979 a s Entry
No. 45164 of O f f i c i a l Records.

R
T h e land referred to in this policy is described as set forth in the mortgage above mentioned, and identified as follows:

The following described real property is situated in Utah County,
State of Utah, to-wit:
PARCEL 1: All of Lots 1 to 57, inclusive, Plat "A", LAKE MEADCWS
SUBDIVISION, a subdivision, of Provo, Utah, according to the official
plat thereof on file in the office of the County Recorder of Utah
County, State of Utah.
PARCEL 2: F-1455-61-1 Building 4 J Floor 3, Unite B, WILLCWBROOK HILL
CONDOMINIUMS, Provo, Utah, according to the official plat thereof
and subject to the recitals thereon on file in the office of the County
Recorder of Utah County, State of Utah.
PARCEL 2: F-1466-61-1 Building 5, Floor 1, Unite D, WILLCWBROOK HILL
CONDOMINIUMS, Provo, Utah, according to the official plat thereof
and subject to the recitals thereon on file in the office of the County
Recorder of Utah County, State of Utah.
* *** * *** *

The Title Guarantee Company

CONDITIONS AND STIPULATIONS
L.

Definition of Terms
The following terms when used in this policy mean:
(a) "insured": the insured named in Schedule A. The term "insured"
also includes ( i ) the owner of the indebtedness secured by the insured
mortgage and each successor in ownership of such indebtedness (reserving,
however, all rights and defenses as to any such successor who acquires the
indebtedness by operation of law as distinguished from purchase including,
but not limited to, heirs, distributees, devisees, survivors, personal representatives, next of kin or corporate or fiduciary successors that the
Company would have had against the successor's transferor), and further
includes (ii) any governmental agency or instrumentality which is an
insurer or guarantor under an insurance contract or guaranty insuring or
guaranteeing said indebtedness, or any part thereof, whether named as an
insured herein or not, and (iii) the parties designated in paragraph 2 (a)
of these Conditions and Stipulations.
(b) "insured claimant": an insured claiming loss or damage hereunder.
(c) "knowledge": actual knowledge, not constructive knowledge or
notice which may be imputed to an insured by reason of any public
records.
(d) "land": the land described, specifically or by reference in Schedule A, and improvements affixed thereto which by law constitute real
property; provided, however, the term "land" does not include any property beyond the lines of the area specifically described or referred to in
Schedule A, nor any right, title, interest, estate or easement in abutting
streets, roads, avenues, alleys, lanes, ways or waterways, but nothing herein
shall modify or limit the extent to which a right of access to and from the
land is insured by this policy.
(e) "mortgage": mortgage, deed of trust, trust deed, or other security
instrument.
(f) "public records": those records which by law impart constructive notice of matters relating to said land.
2. (a) Continuation of Insurance after Acquisition of Title
This policy shall continue in force as of Date of Policy in favor of an
insured who acquires all or any part of the estate or interest in the land
described in Schedule A by foreclosure, trustee's sale, conveyance in lieu
of foreclosure, or other legal manner which discharges the lien of the insured mortgage, and if the insured is a corporation, its transferree of the
estate or interest so acquired, provided the transferee is the parent or
wholly owned subsidiary of the insured; and in favor of any governmental
agency or instrumentality which acquires all or any part of the estate or
interest pursuant to a contract of insurance or guaranty insuring or
guaranteeing the indebtedness secured by the insured mortgage; provided
that the amount of insurance hereunder after such acquisition, exclusive
of costs, attorneys' lees and expenses which the Company may become
obligated to pay, shall not exceed the least of:
(i)
the amount of insurance stated in Schedule A;
(ii)
the amount of the unpaid principal of the indebtedness as defined
in paragraph 8 hereof, plus interest thereon, expenses of foreclosure and amounts advanced to protect the lien of the insured
mortgage and secured by said insured mortgage at the time of
acquisition of such estate or interest in the land; or
(iii) the amount paid by any governmental agency or instrumentality,
if such agency or instrumentality is the insured claimant, in the
acquisition of such estate or interest in satisfaction of its insurance contract or guaranty.
( b ) Continuation of Insurance after Conveyance of Title
The coverage of this policy shall continue in force as of Date of Policy
in favor of an insured so long as such insured retains an estate or
interest in the land, or holds an indebtedness secured by a purchase money
mortgage given by a purchaser from such insured, or so long as such
insured shall have liability by reason of covenants of warranty made by
such insured in any transfer or conveyance of such estate or interest; provided, however, this policy shall not continue in force in favor of any
purchaser from such insured of either said estate or interest or the indebtedness secured by a purchase money mortgage given to such insured.
3. Defense and Prosecution of Actions—Notice of Claim to be given
by an Insured Claimant
(a) The Company, at its own cost and without undue delay, shall

provide for the defense of an insured in all litigation consisting of actions
or proceedings commenced against such insured, or defenses, restraining
orders or injunctions interposed against I foreclosure of the insured
mortgage or a defense interposed against an insured in an action to enforce
a contract for a sale of the indebtedness secured by the insured mortgage,
or a sale of the estate or interest in said land, to the extent that such
litigation is founded upon an alleged defect, lien, encumbrance, or other
matter insured against by this policy.
(b) The injured shall notify the Company promptly in writing ( i ) in
case any action or proceeding is begun or defense or restraining order or
injunction is interposed as set forth in (a) above, (ii) in case knowledge
shall come to an insured hereunder of any claim of title or interest which
is adverse to the title to the estate or interest or the lien of the insured
mortgage, as insured, and which might cause loss or damage for whicli
the Company may be liable by virtue of this policy, or (iii) ii title to the
estate or interest or the lien of the insured mortgage, as insured, is rejected as unmarketable. If such prompt notice shall not be given to the
Company, then as to such insured all liability of the Company shall cease
and terminate in regard to the matter or matters for which such prompt
notice is required; provided, however, that failure to notify shall in no
case prejudice ihe rights of any such insured under this policy unless the
Company shall be prejudiced by such failure and then only to the extent of such prejudice.
(c) The Company shall have the right at its own cost to institute and
without undue delay prosecute any action or proceeding or to do any
other act which in its opinion may be necessary or desirable to establish
the title to the estate or interest or the lien of the insured mortgage, as
insured, and the Company may take any appropriate action under the
terms of this policy, whether or not it shall be liable thereunder, and shaii
not thereby concede liability or waive any provision of this policy.
(d) Whenever the Company shall have brought any action or interposed a defense as required or permitted by the provisions of this policy,
the Company may pursue any such litigation to final determination by a
court of competent jurisdiction and expressly reserves the right, in its
sole discretion, to appeal from any adverse judgment or order.
(e) In all cases where the policy permits or requires the Company to
prosecute or provide for the defense of any action or proceeding, the
insured hereunder shall secure to the Company the right to so prosecute
or provide defense in such action or proceeding, and all appeals therein^
and permit the Company to use, at its option, the name of such insured
for such purpose. Whenever requested by the Company, such insured shall
give the Company all reasonable aid in any such action or proceeding, in
effecting settlement, securing evidence, obtaining witnesses, or prosecuting
or defending such action or proceeding, and the Company shall reimburse
such insured for any expense so incurred.
4. Notice of Ix>ss—Limitation of Action
In addition to the notices required under paragraph 3(b) of these
Conditions and Stipulations, a statement in writing of any loss or damage
for which it is claimed the Company is liable under this policy shall be
furnished to the Company within 90 days after such loss or damage shall
have been determined and no right of action shall accrue to an insured
claimant until 30 days after such statement shall have been furnished.
Failure to furnish such statement of loss or damage shall terminate any
liability of the Company under this policy as to such loss or damage.
5.

Options to Pay or Otherwise Settle Claims
The Company shall have the option to pay or otherwise settle for or in
the name of an insured claimant any claim insured against or to terminate
all liability and obligations of the Company hereunder by paying or
tendering payment of the amount of insurance under this policy together
with any costs, attorneys' fees and expenses incurred up to the time of
such payment or tender of payment, by the insured claimant and
authorized by the Company. In case loss or damage is claimed under this
policy by an insured, the Company shall have the further option to
purchase such indebtedness for the amount owing thereon together with
ail costs, attorneys' fees and expenses which the Company is obligated
hereunder to pay. If the Company offers to purchase said indebtedness as
herein provided; the owner of such indebtedness shall transfer and assign
said indebtedness and the mortgage and any collateral securing the same
to the Company upon payment therefor as herein provided.
/

CONTINUED ON BACK

CONDITIONS AND STIPULATIONS—Continued
Determination and Payment of Loss
(a) The liability of the Company under this policy shall in no case
xceed the least of:
the actual loss of the insured claimant; or
(i)
the amount of insurance stated in Schedule A, or, if applicable,
(ii)
the amount of insurance as denned in paragraph 2(a) hereof; or
(iii) the amount of the indebtedness secured by the insured mortgage
as determined under paragraph 8 hereof, at the time the loss or
damage insured against hereunder occurs, together with interest
thereon.
(b) The Company wttt pay, in addition to any loss insured'ngainst by
his policy, all costs imposed upon an insured in litigation carried on by
he Company for such insured, and all costs, attorneys' fees and expenses
i litigation carried on by such insured with the written authorization of
ie Company.
(c) When liability has been definitely fixed in accordance with the
onditions of this policy, the loss or damage shall be payable within 30
ays thereafter.
. Limitation of Liability
N o claim shall arise or be maintainable under this policy (a) if the
lompany, after having received notice of an alleged defect, lien or
ncumbrance insured against hereunder, by litigation or otherwise, renoves such defect, lien or encumbrance or establishes the title, or the lien
\f the insured mortgage, as insured, within a reasonable time after receipt
>f such notice; (b) in the event of litigation until there has been a final
letermination by a court of competent jurisdiction, and disposition of all
ppeals therefrom, adverse to the title or to the lien of the insured
nortgage, as insured, as provided in paragraph 3 hereof; or (c) for
lability voluntarily assumed by an insured in settling any claim or suit
vithout prior written consent of the Company.
3. Reduction of Liability
(a) All payments under this policy, except payments made for costs,
ittorneys' fees and expenses, shall reduce the amount of the insurance pro
tanto; provided, however, such payments, prior to the acquisition of title
to said estate or interest as provided in paragraph 2(a) of these Conditions and Stipulations, shall not reduce pro tanto the amount of the insurance afforded hereunder except to the extent that such payments reduce
the amount of the indebtedness secured by the insured mortgage.
Payment in full by any person or voluntary satisfaction or release of the
insured mortgage shall terminate all liability of the Company except as
provided in paragraph 2(a) hereof.
(b) The liability of the Company shall not be increased by additional
principal indebtedness created subsequent to Date of Policy, except as to
amounts advanced to protect the lien of the insured mortgage and secured
thereby.
No payment shall be made without producing this policy for endorsement of such payment unless the policy be lost or destroyed, in which
case proof of loss or destruction shall be furnished to the satisfaction of
the Company.
9. Liability Noncumulative
If the insured acquires title to the estate or interest in satisfaction of

the indebtedness secured by the insured mortgage, or any part thereof, it is
expressly understood that the amount of insurance under this policy shall
be reduced by any amount the Company may pay under any policy
insuring a mortgage hereafter executed by an insured which is a charge or
lien on the estate or interest described or referred to in Schedule A, and
the amount so paid shall be deemed a payment under this policy.
10. Subrogation Upon Payment or Settlement
Whenever the Company shall have settled a claim under this policy, all
right of subrogation shall vest in the Company unaffected by any act of
the insured claimant, except that the owner of the indebtedness secured by
the insured mortgage may release or substitute the personal liability of any
debtor or guarantor, or extend or otherwise modify the terms of payment,
or release a portion of the estate or interest from the lien of the insured
mortgage, or release any collateral security for the indebtedness, provided
such act occurs prior to receipt by the insured of notice of any claim of
title or interest adverse to the title to the estate or interest or the priority
of the lien of the insured mortgage and does not result in any loss of
priority of the lien of the insured mortgage. The Company shall be
subrogated to and be entitled to all rights and remedies which such
insured claimant would have had against any person or property in respect
to such claim had this policy not been issued, and ii requested by the
Company, such insured claimant shall transfer to the Company all rights,
and remedies against any person or property necessary in order to perfect
such right of subrogation and shall permit the Company to use the name
of such insured claimant in any transaction or litigation involving such
rights or remedies. If the payment does not cover the loss of such insured
claimant, the Company shall be subrogated to such rights and remedies;
in the proportion which said payment bears to the amount of said loss, but
such subrogation shall be in subordination to the insured mortgage. If loss
of priority should result from any act of such insured claimant, such act
shall not void this policy, but the Company, in that event, shall be required to pay only that part of any losses insured against hereunder which
shall exceed the amount, if any, lost to the Company by reason of the inv
pairment of the right of subrogation.
11. Liability Limited to this Policy
This instrument together with all endorsements and other instruments,
if any, attached hereto by the Company is the entire policy and contract
between the insured and the Company.
Any claim of loss or damage, whether or not based on negligence, and
which arises out of the status of the lien of the insured mortgage or of
the title to the estate or interest covered hereby or any action asserting
such claim, shall be restricted to the provisions and conditions and stipulations of this policy.
No amendment of or endorsement to this policy can be made except by
writing endorsed hereon or attached hereto signed by either the President,
a Vice President, the Secretary, an Assistant Secretary, or validating officer
or authorized signatory of the Company.
12. Notices, Where Sent
All notices required to be given the Company and any statement in
writing required to be furnished the Company shall be addressed to
it at its Home Office, Baltimore, Maryland 21202.
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